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I have received generous help in my informal survey of environmental economics in 
Canada, but it is important to stress that my opinions are my own. Edmund Blewett, Robin 
Boadway, Louis Cain, Brian Copeland, Rod Dobell, Diane Dupont, Kathryn Harrison, John 
Livernois, Stephen McClellan, Andrew Muller, Nancy Olewiler, Peter H. Pearse, Roger 
Reid, Fred Riggs, John Robinson, John Sargent, Claude Simard, Rob Smith, Mark Sproule-
Jones, C. van Kooten and Peter Victor have all provided useful information, as did those 
others who a few years ago provided material for an earlier paper on a related subject (Scott, 
2000). Jennifer Wood efficiently helped me to locate materials.  
Canadian economists analyze environmental problems much as do American 
economists. They use the same tools. They are in abstract agreement with the 
goals of the American economists and their policy-making bosses. But there 
the agreement stops. Within the United States, economists presume that the 
selection and implementation of actual environmental policies and of tangible 
targets is a task for the national government. Within Canada, there is no 
consensus on whose task it is. Canadian economists are kept busy with plans 
or decisions made at provincial and at national levels of government. 
Sometimes this results in small-scale systems of regulation reflecting local 
notions about what is ideal and what is fair. Goals and standards may differ 
from place to place.   
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The standard literature reflects a large body of research and reflection by 
U.S. economists, forced to deal with problems of U.S. national policy and 
choice. As professionals, Canadian economists also become familiar with this 
standard analytical approach, one that leading economists constantly refine. 
Indeed they contribute to it. Yet they may find it only partly relevant to the 
actual diversity of problems, physical opportunities, preferences, distributional 
goals and constitutional powers facing the provincial decision-makers who 
look to them.  
In 1985 and 1995, I reviewed the allocation of functions in a federation 
by examining the assignment of powers over the environment. I found that  
there was no reason why all the environmental powers should be assigned to 
one of two levels. Nevertheless, the various theories I discovered and tested 
suggested that when governments were competitive, there would be a 
tendency for the powers over one field to drift in one direction. 
In this paper, I start from the other end: from public functions and 
policies, not from levels of government. To do this, I review some of the 
history of environmental activities in England, in the United States and in 
Canada. I then review what economists have had to say about these activities. 
This is followed by a review of what Canadian economists say and do, 
compared with what economists in the United States say and do.  
Environmental economics is a young subject, only slightly younger than 
the environmental policy with which it is most concerned. Environmental 
policy is still in its infancy, especially policies dealing with pollution, in 
particular, global air pollution. The institutions in which policy is to be framed 







Britain.  For centuries, efforts to escape from pollution required victims to 
push the doctrines of common law: nuisance actions dealt with inter-property 
flows of smoke and fumes, while property-law doctrines dealt with the 
changes in the quality of water flowing in streams. These two branches of the 
law were helpful mainly when there were only two parties: a single victim 
whose enjoyment of property was reduced by harmful effluents from a single 
identified mill or factory. Where several ordinary parties suffered from the 
effluents of many upstream factories, the common-law courts offered no 
remedy.   
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In the industrial revolution, to escape from this limitation, water-pollution 
victims bypassed the courts and appealed directly to Parliament. The 
Victorian politicians obliged, but only on a local scale: with public-health acts 
requiring reduction of urban sewage, and with fisheries-protection legislation 
banning stream pollution. But, when it came to making general doctrine about 
who had personal rights to pollute and who had rights to be free from 
pollution, the politicians seemed unwilling to go much further than had the 
courts. And when it came to enforcement, the government’s statutes were 
weak. Thus, although in 1876 Britain did enact a water pollution law directed 
against everyone dumping wastes into rivers, the law had no national 
inspectorate. Local councils applied to local courts for an order to require a 
factory to stop polluting. The innovation was that the new law focused the 
courts’ attention on the condition of the river not on the harm that was or was 
not suffered by selected victims.
1 
Air pollution policy evolved differently. In the 1860s and 1870s, 
Parliament enacted the Alkali Laws,
2 a series of laws focusing attention on 
the standards in factories within alkali industries using soda and acid products 
and also in copper smelters (coal was not included). Just as significantly, it 
established a monitoring and enforcement body, the famous Alkali 
Inspectorate, whose report and observations and experiences provided bases 
for early changes in the laws. The standards that emerged under the Alkali 
Laws were aimed at reducing the harmful wastes from polluters’ practices in 
the factories. They were not directly concerned with the property or health of 
victims of air pollution, nor with the air or water conditions. Only minor 
progress was made thereafter. Britain did not pass any smoke or smog statute 
to match the Alkali Laws. The Great Depression discouraged new legislation 
so that “smokeless zones” were postponed until after World War II and, after 
a devastating smog incident, a Clean Air Act until 1952.  
 
                                                             
1Elworthy and Holder (1997, p. 64). Polluters could still rely on the defence that 
they were already using the “best practical means” available in that industry and place. 
2See Elworthy and Holder (1997, pp. 62 and 217). The alkali industries, starting 
with salt, manufactured sodium sulphate, carbonate and hydrate, and various compounds of 
chlorine. Many of these were raw materials for other products, such as soap, textiles, 
explosives, paper and pharmaceutical alkaloids. The dangerous and unpleasant waste 
products included muriatic (hydro-chloric) acid and sulphur oxides.   
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United States.  American water-quality laws steadily built on older common-
law, fishery, and public-health and sanitation powers, somewhat as in Britain. 
All were at the state level (see Melosi, 2000; Cain, 1978).  
We do not find the American federal government addressing pollution 
problems until after the Second World War. It started with a clean water 
program. Between the wars New Deal spending had been channelled into 
river-basin development, financing jobs and helping farmers, as was permitted 
by the Constitution. The projects chosen dealt with navigation, flood 
prevention and hydro power. Pollution, health and sewage were left to the 
states, and the “environment” was not considered (see Weiland et al., 1997). 
This distribution of responsibility continued until, in the 1960s, almost 
suddenly, clean water and in-stream sewage dilution were included in the 
national legislation. The administration’s multiple-purpose, water-resource 
agency was authorized to make plans for improved in-stream aeration and 
diversion, and also to consider alternative projects for treating pollution 
emissions and preventing waste production. In a few years, the engineering 
search for river-basin projects was being transformed into a water-quality 
search for projects and policy instruments in aid of the “environment” with 
benefits for recreation, aesthetics, wildlife, and so on quickly included as 
national concerns.  
A federal clean-air program came later. There had been a long-standing 
policy of leaving air pollution control in states’ hands (Dewey, 2000). Coal 
smoke and other industrial fumes and emissions had evoked complaints 
which gave rise to flurries of rudimentary local and state legislation and 
control activity. Although at one stage Chicago built on a common-law 
approach by declaring smoke to be a nuisance per se, the typical state 
legislative approach was to impose standards of plant equipment, materials or 
process (as with the British Alkali Laws). In the 1930s, St. Louis introduced 
rules about coal quality. This regulatory method was widely applied to heavy 
industry during and after World War II. It might be said to have reached 
reach a climax when California began to make car-exhaust standards, long 
before there was any national standard.  
To deal with smoke and pollutants drifting across their borders, the states 
adopted agreements or “compacts” to deal with cross-border flows of 
industrial wastes. Federal clean-air acts left them to it until state activities fell 
far behind public opinion.  
In the 1970s federal agencies were given powers to intervene within 
states, researching and identifying local problems and also imposing standards 
that the states would have to meet. As Andrew Thompson wryly observed in 
1980, “With an English positivist tradition, the Canadian lawyer can scarcely 
credit as law a statute like the United States National Environmental Policy  
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Act, 1969  (NEPA) which merely declares a national policy and directs 
government agencies [including state agencies] to establish conforming 
procedures. Yet NEPA is law, and has had more influence in Canada than 
any Canadian statute” (1980, p. 15).  
 
Canada.  In Canada, the nineteenth century courts carried on with English 
common law on private nuisance, and riparian principles of property law on 
water quality.  
The provinces adapted some of the British public-health laws, including 
those that would now be called pollution policies. They had jurisdiction over 
water quality in inland waters, but shared this with Ottawa when it came to 
boundary waters such as the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. They had 
jurisdiction over air quality, but in fact took almost no action against smelter 
and sawmill emissions.
3 
The Dominion government  was excluded from most public-health 
functions. After the 1880s it could use its fishery powers to legislate against 
dumping “deleterious” substances into most rivers. Later, it also found that its 
powers over navigation were a possible legal base for pollution law-making. 
                                                             
3Two well-publicized air pollution situations were that of the smelters at Trail, B.C. 
and at Sudbury, Ontario. 
Thus in the nineteenth century, legislatures and local governments in 
England, the American states and the Canadian provinces began to take over 
environmental-quality law-making from the courts. Long tolerant of fumes, 
smoke and chemicals, legislatures were eventually driven by concerns about 
sanitation, health, and fisheries, to aid municipalities to develop clean water 
supplies and to make simple rules about dumping wastes in streams. As for 
air pollution, change was very gradual. When legislation did come, it was 
similar to factory and safety laws, concerned with particular practices, 
materials and, especially, particular items of equipment. But in most 
jurisdictions, the neighbours of establishments emitting fumes and smoke just 
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Reactions from Economists 
 
 
Market Failure and Ideal Output  
 
It cannot be said that these developments received much attention from 
economists or economic historians.
4 Even those mid-Victorian writers who 
did take a broad interest in “social conditions”, such as Marx and Engels, Mill 
and Marshall, had little to say about the abatement of water or air pollution.  
Sidgwick, Edgeworth and especially Pigou did mention pollution. Their 
references were incidental to their efforts to explain how a general equilibrium 
of the competitive market economy might produce a socially- optimal 
allocation of resources (“ideal output”). Their basic theory was that goods 
sold in a non-competitive market would be over-priced, bringing excessive 
profits to firms in such a market, so attracting excessive factors of production. 
Improving market competitiveness would lead to a re-shuffling of inputs and 
an increase in the value of total output. As a supplement to this idea of mis-
allocation they considered a similar cause for a distorted allocation of inputs 
among goods and markets: excessive profits for firms that gained from 
“unpaid factors” and externalities or spillovers. The jobs of making markets 
competitive and of correcting spillovers should fall to government.  
The economists rather casually mentioned pollution as an illustration of 
unpriced or unpaid inputs, and emissions taxes as remedies. But their writings 
do not suggest they had familiarized themselves with actual research on 
pollution.
5 Pigou’s insistence on the market’s failure to make the best of the 
economy was reinforced primarily by his studies of monopoly and imperfect 
competition, not of the pricing or handling of water and air pollutants.
6 These 
                                                             
4And my casual search of one-volume modern economic histories produced almost 
no mention of water supplies, water pollution, air pollution or the Alkali Acts. In France, the 
elite Ponts et Chausees institute may have developed analyzes from an economic point of 
view, as may its German equivalent, but I have found little trace of them in modern secondary 
materials.  
5In 1950, K.W. Kapp made a valuable collection of the evidence on external 
diseconomies (“extra social costs”), directed at economists. It is striking that little if any of his 
material came from previous economists’ studies.  
6Theorizing about the correction of externalities had passed its peak in the 1950s. 
Little of it came from economists’ studies. Ciriacy-Wantrup, foremost in dealing with natural-
resource conservation and policy, in 1952 also referred briefly to pollution and other external  
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theorists usually had in mind the problems of markets in a simple two-level 
world of consumers and manufacturers.  
But in the real world, external diseconomies and spillovers were 
encountered where there were non-homogeneous raw materials, uncertainty, 
exhaustibility and unsure ownership. In 1958, Bator pointed to non-price 
relationships as between producer and consumer, producer and producer, 
consumer and consumer, and employer-employee. A feeling for the working 
of these relations could not be gained by considering defects in just one kind 
of market. Practical knowledge, experience and measurement were necessary 
before anything very useful could be said about the society’s ideal allocation 
of scarce inputs to waste disposal of heterogeneous, unappropriated, raw 
materials. Realizing this, the economists said very little about pollution.  
                                                                                                                                        
effects, but concentrated on finding a role for government in resource conservation. It is 
interesting that, in the 1950s, he makes no mention of Pigovian taxes. One gathers politicians 
paid little attention to the marginal effect of taxes. They regarded charges as penalties for 
reinforcing regulation. Pigou’s later discussion of “his” tax is disappointing (see Public 
Finance, 1947, pp. 99-100). In Baumol’s 1952 thesis, the author argues that the state exists 
because various kinds of externality-distortion cannot be dealt with individually or in the 
marketplace. Although he quotes Mill, Pigou and especially Sidgwick, as prior users of 
natural-resource examples of environmental externalities (such as floods and pollution) to 
justify the collective actions of the state, Baumol himself rarely pauses to consider these 
problems. That is also true of most of the writings of late-1940s contemporaries in the “ideal 
output” debate: Kahn, Lerner, Myint, etc.  
In the mid-1950s, attention was directed from market behaviour and 
failure to the problems of collective choice. Paul Samuelson, with public-
expenditure theorists, suggested models of the economy in which firm-
consumer markets were only a part of the economic mechanism. At first 
government action had been regarded as an instrument to avert or repair the 
damage of market failure. The new group of theorists attempted to use the 
same economic principles as had been used to explain the supply and demand 
view of the marketplace to explain the joint-supply or collective-supply view 
of public organization. What kinds of goods; what kinds of persons; what 
kinds of production processes indicate a need for public supply? Considering 
all the modes of public supply, which modes could be predicted to be adopted 
for the production of each kind of good (regulation, subsidy, public 
production)? To these questions had to be added the old public finance or 
distributional questions: given a public supply, how should the tax burden be 
divided, and how should individual tastes for political and governmental 
systems be incorporated? 
For those attempting to generalize about the place of government in the 
economy, the intricacy of these questions was discouraging. But for those 
who were increasingly alert to the problems of the environment, the new  
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models were encouraging. They at least suggested that the same public-choice 
mechanism that determined the individual output of goods and services was 
involved in the output of jointly-supplied public services, and that these public 
services included the management and protection of the environment. Indeed, 
while early theoretical discussions of public goods often revolved around the 
creation of  man-made  facilities such as those for national defence or 
transportation, early quantitative exercises often centred on the preservation 
of natural sites, such as climate modification, hunting and fishing recreation, 
and wildlife preservation.  
 
 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Pollution 
 
While the economists in the externalities debate were busy adding to the list 
of difficulties in identifying the ideal output of an economy, and the 
difficulties of obtaining consent on public goods, in 1936 the United States’ 
administration and Congress developed a standard benefit-cost (b/c) approach 
to water-project selection. This was quickly adapted for projects having 
multiple purposes
7 (not just flood control but also power, irrigation and 
navigation).
8 William Baumol wrote that the economists involved in 
standardizing benefit-cost project comparisons were “doing the hard work 
involved in giving substance and application to the theory of externalities and 
public expenditure” (1969, p. 22). 
Nevertheless, cleaning up a polluted river, the standard example in the 
externality literature, was left out of official federal benefit-cost analysis, as it 
                                                             
7Engineering evaluations of public-works projects were attuned to business 
investment evaluation methods, such as for railways, for example. Economists concentrated 
on the effect of decreasing costs and of monopoly (see Schumpeter, 1954, p. 949). In 1952, 
this procedure was heavily supplemented by welfare-economics (or national-income-
maximizing) concepts. Probably similar reforms were being made in other countries, but the 
enormous scale of almost routine spending on American river-basin projects focused 
attention on U.S. federal procedures (see Prest and Turvey, 1967). 
8To help with dating, it seems that in the planning of the American side of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway project, stretching from the 1930s to 1955, there was never a 
comprehensive comparison of the Seaway package of projects with possible alternatives (see 
Willoughby, 1960). However, some ten years later, both American and Canadian sides of the 
Columbia River Treaty negotiations (1958–63) were more sophisticated. Krutilla (1967, pp. 
199-201) suggests that the Canadian team may actually have done more homework 
regarding the economic implications of various alternative river systems than the U.S. team.  
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was not one of the “purposes” of multiple-purpose river-basin develop-ment. 
Responsibility for public health, waste disposal, and sewage was still entrusted 
to the states and localities, not to the federal government. Con-sequently, it 
remained a subject for public-health and engineering experts, not economists.
9 
Although there may be other forerunners, much of the credit for the 
introduction of steady, detailed, quantitative study of water pollution policies 
into federal benefit-cost analysis must go to economists at Resources for the 
Future in Washington, DC.
10 The story goes that in 1963 the Corps of 
Engineers proposed to create reservoirs in the Potomac River to augment low 
summer flows and to improve the sewage assimilative capacity of the estuary. 
The economists, all recreationists and canoeists, became alarmed as, in the 
course of the benefit-cost studies of this project, they learned the reservoirs 
would spoil white-water canoeing. This threat concentrated their thinking into 
looking for a wider range of approaches to water-quality improvement, 
including collective treatment, a process then beyond the Corps’ range of 
alternatives.  
After 1960, the new environmental movement, spreading alarm about the 
capacity of nature to support economic growth, attracted economists. They 
considered regulation versus property (Coase, 1960), materials scarcity and 
growth (Barnett and Morse, 1963); natural limits ( the Club of Rome 1972) 
and resources and growth (Solow, 1974) and the eclectic idea of sustainable 
development (Brundtland Report, 1987). And they began to apply analysis to 
toxic pesticides (Carson, 1962), ocean pollution, endangered species, acid 
rain, CFCs and global warming — each of these suggesting new twists on the 
measurement of benefits and costs of environmental policies.  
It is not clear when Canadian jurisdictions began to utilize anything like 
benefit-cost analysis. I have the impression that after World War II 
                                                             
9There were  economists specializing in local-government public finance who did 
work on civic enterprises such as sanitation, and Pigou and the Webbs in England did 
continue to consider urban enterprises. It is always a surprise  for visitors from the United 
States and Canada to find that in the U.K. government it is to the municipal-affairs 
department that  “environmental” problems have been assigned, reflecting the historical local-
government focus on public-health  policies (see Cain, 1978). In 1955, in his thesis, the 
splendid Water-Resource Development: The Economics of Project Evaluation, Otto 
Eckstein does not mention pollution, waste, sewage and so on.  In the important Maass et al. 
report on their early 1960s work on design of water-resource systems, Maass and Dorfman 
do mention pollution abatement, but only in order to assume it away from their calculations 
and arguments.  
10Including D’Arge, Kneese, Krutilla, Herfindahl and Fox.   
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politicians, treasury boards and their consultants all devoted their efforts to 
improving engineering-type studies of the costs of various scales of project. 
An informal benefit-cost manual was produced for Canadian use in 1962, and 
an official volume manual a dozen years later.
11 There were plenty of 
postwar opportunities, including the International Joint Commission’s 
Columbia River projects, the St. Lawrence waterway projects, and the South 
Saskatchewan Dam. All of these were intensively examined, of course. But 
I suspect that only the Winnipeg project received anything approaching the 
kind of survey of “all, benefits, all costs, and all alternatives” urged in the 




Minimal Economists: Environmental Impact Statements 
 
The environmental impact statement or assessment (EIA) came to general 
attention in the United States when it was added as a requirement of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. It was intended to force 
an action from the agencies and states when NEPA was otherwise merely a 
statement of Congress’ principles (Weiland et al., 1997, p. 101). Those who 
submitted a project proposal were required to provide the information so that 
professional experts could judge the effect of the project on the environment. 
Soon after the United Kingdom and other countries in the European 
Commission
13 adopted a similar EIA requirement. In 1973 Canada also made 
an environmental assessment review process a main element of legislation. 
This step integrated environmental considerations into the government 
project-selection and policy-making process, whether or not the project or 
policy being reviewed had an “environmental” purpose. Some Canadian 
provinces also adopted their own EIA laws or procedures. In addition to its 
                                                             
11The first Canadian guide took into account the U.S. water-resource benefit-cost 
rules that evolved through 1952 and the “Policies, Standards and Procedures” of 1962. They 
had been sponsored by the Bureau of the Budget, while the Canadian guide had no official 
standing. The Treasury Board Secretariat produced a benefit-cost analysis guide in 1976. 
There was then really no official Canadian doctrine to say that only increases or decreases in 
national income should count. 
12See the report by Clarence Barber. Thanks to T. Shoyama and Robin Boadway 
for discussions.  
13See Elworthy and Holder (1997, pp 388-421) for EIAs in the United Kingdom 
and the EC.  
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applicability to federal government projects, the Canadian EIA law had the 
surprising effect of imposing federal environmental concerns onto project 
proposals for provincial projects. For example, litigation forcing an 
embarrassed federal government to conduct EIAs of the Rafferty-Alameda 
dam (1989), and the Oldman River dam (1992) was significant in pointing out 
a wider federal environmental jurisdiction than the provinces or even Ottawa 
had realized.
14 
In many countries, making environmental impact assessments and giving 
them weight in project design and selection became routine procedures. 
Canadian jurisdictions were not as enthusiastic, as politicians in Ottawa and most 
provinces endeavoured not to lose detailed control over public-works spending.
15 One time-
honoured procedure was to appoint ad hoc Commissions of Inquiry or Royal Commissions. 
When a bridge, port, railway or o ther resource or environmental matter was under 
discussion, such inquiries could obtain information while helping to cool the disputants. One 
example was the 1975–77 (Berger) northern-territories pipeline inquiry, noted for its author’s 
concern about communal and socio-economic impacts as well as purely environmental 
impacts. (It came quite soon after Quirin’s 1962 business-like investment study of northern oil 
and gas prospects — one that, remarkably, had been able to avoid saying anything about 
social, community or ecological impacts.) Ad hoc reports such as Berger’s were able to 
weigh social and environmental factors at some length, but they made a minor contribution to 
the building-up of a framework for environmental analysis — scientific, sociological or 
economic. I am not aware that environmental economists in Canada have given these studies, 
or the data in them, much attention.
16 By their uniqueness they created no precedent: the 




                                                             
14For an up-to-date account of this litigation and its aftermath, see Field and 
Olewiler (forthcoming, ch. 15). 
15Most jurisdictions began to call for EIAs to consider public policy alternatives, 
and their effects on the region’s resources. Some suggested merging benefit-cost analyses 
with EIAs. Of course, there were numerous difficulties. In good benefit-cost analysis, double 
counting is prevented by final-product or national-income (net) concepts. The environment, 
however, has no final product. Everything that is impacted is as important as anything else. 
Thus EIA is analogous to economic impact where every dollar change in sales is counted, 
even if that dollar is already included within another item. 
16Compare the continuing reference by Canadian fisheries economists, to the 
reports of the Sol Sinclair, Pearse and Kirby fisheries inquiries.   
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Teaching and Research: Environmental Economics beyond 
Benefit-Cost Analysis and the EIA  
 
Economists who taught the subject left environmental impact to “environ-
mental scientists”. They had their hands full as old controversies about 
benefit-cost analysis gave way to a very wide range of topics, always 
including “pollution economics”. They concentrated on five or six main policy 




Land use.  This policy area is a natural, especially for economists and 
departments for whom i t is simply a continuation of earlier work in land 
economics, agricultural economics, regional economics and urban economics. 
Today’s economists are busy in related fields such as recreation (and parks 
and reserves) and endangered species. Many of their fields of interest are 
shared with geographers. Pioneering institutions like Resources for the Future 
were manned primarily by land-use specialists. By now all policy areas in 
environmental economics have borrowed land-use valuation concepts such as 
irreversibility, option value, existence value, travel-cost and contingent 
valuation, and policy approaches such as safe minimum standards, 
transferable development rights and land-use reserves. Perhaps relatively 
fewer Canadians than Americans are in this field, though that is just an 
impression.  
 
The environment, total output and economic growth. From Malthus to the 
Club of Rome to the Brundtland report, economists have participated in 
asking about the influence of resources on output and growth. Since the 
                                                             
17Most curricula also include the economics of exhaustible resources, such as the 
calculus of forest husbandry and mine development, although these are, mainly, traditional 
subjects that do not involve the special topics below. However, the availability of minerals 
and forests does play an important role in theorizing about long-run growth (as treated by the 
old conservation literature from Malthus to Jevons, Ciriacy-Wantrup, Scott and Barnett and 
Morse). As well, open-pit mining and clear-cut logging are often treated as sources of 
environmental degradation; and the rate of mining and of logging are important elements in 
greenhouse-gas calculations. Most classroom curricula also include open-access fisheries and 
their regulation. Indeed much of the second and third topics mentioned below were 
considered in fishery economics long before environmental economics had been invented: 
regulation; taxes, subsidies and individual trade rights. From about the Second World War, 
Canadian economists played important roles in developing concepts in fishery economics.  
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1960s, the condition of the environment, both as cause and effect, has 
attracted equal attention. The idea of “sustainable development”, advanced in 
terms that economists could understand, promoted these inquiries.  
Materials balance and input-output. Early attempts to bring environ-
mental economics, production and wastes together into a single “spaceship 
earth” model were popularized by Kenneth Boulding (1966). Peter Victor 
wrote an outstanding volume on this in 1972, with application to Canada.  
Trade, growth and the environment. In connection with sustainable 
development, environmentalists like Herman Daly (1973) have expressed 
fears about influences of trade, globalization and foreign ownership on the 
environment, growth and sustainability. Their attacks have attracted a 
vigorous literature, perhaps more theoretical than empirical, in which several 
Canadian economists have been very prominent.
18  
Measuring growth (“green accounting”) Robert Repetto and Herman 
Daly represent environmentalists who argue that official economic growth 
data overstates the actual because the statistics do not take into account a 
country’s resource consumption (depletion). Textbooks lay some emphasis 
on this. Responsively, Statistics Canada has made impressive progress 
measuring changes in the value of certain resource stocks. Although some 
Canadian academics have been advisors on these measurement ventures, 
most write as though they did not exist. 
 
Decision-making. Some economists make theoretical investigations of 
agreements, contracting, consent and voting, used to arrive at environmental 
decisions. Their work can be closely related to that in law and economics and 
in public-choice theory.  
 Game theory. Some regard the environment as a common-pool or no-
property resource, and apply game theory to predicting the outcome of 
attempts to come to agreement on policy. This work has not progressed as far 
as that on water use or on fisheries.
19 It would seem that Canadian political 
scientists and lawyers are ahead of economists in studies of the actual 
circumstances of environmental decision-making.  
                                                             
18For example, in a recent paper, B. Copeland, B. Antweiler and S. Taylor 
(forthcoming) set out a theory of how openness to international goods markets affects 
pollution concentrations, using trade theory and S02 data from the Global Environment 
Monitoring Project. Combining estimates of scale, composition and technique effects yields 
the surprising conclusion that freer trade appears to reduce overall pollution.  
19See Ostrom et al. (1994). The authors’ very general, and informed, approach to 
common-pool “resources” has almost nothing to say about polluters or the environment.   
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Costs and benefits. In Canada, making studies of economic “impact”, 
ranging from changes in local employment to changes in national income are 
the bread-and-butter of government economists, consultants and some 
academics. On the demand side, these make use of questionnaire techniques 
to predict utilization of proposed changes in land or environmental use. On 
the supply side, they make use of regional input-output techniques.
20 
Although in Canada these evaluations are not usually combined into one all-
inclusive benefit-cost assessment, each part may be used to support a finding 
on “feasibility” (more below). 
 
Choice of instruments. Taxes, subsidies, marketable permits, access to 
nuisance and tort law, contracts, public undertakings, enforcement by 
damages versus enforcement by injunction, monitoring — these topics in 
environmental economic fields are outgrowths of similar economic studies in 
the fields of public finance, public expenditure, industrial organization, and 
law and economics. 
Tort law.  A number of economists, now expert in tort law, have 
investigated the history and modern applicability of common-law remedies for 
harmful pollution and land use (Dewees, 1995; Posner, 1977, ch. 13). Many 
provincial health, sanitation and environmental regulations have been drafted 
and even worded as updates of common-law doctrines.  
Regulation. As already mentioned, since the nineteenth century, regula-
tion has been seen as the practical answer to common-property effects on the 
environment. Pollution regulation takes the form either of control and 
monitoring of the processes and materials used by a polluter, or control of the 
amount of emissions themselves. Verification of compliance of the first is 
much easier than the second, and has long been chosen by local govern-
ments, already experienced with quarantine and sanitation controls. It was the 
low-cost, flexible method chosen to reduce smoke emissions, both industrial 
and residential. Dewees (1995) has studied equipment requirements by 
reducing SO2 emissions from smelters; and Muller has examined pulp mill 
equipment standards. “Standards” may mean that such equipment regulations 
have been standardized as between different jurisdictions. Control of 
emissions is more direct, but more costly to enforce, initially.
21 Many 
                                                             
20Input-output is also used on the demand side, when there is an expected change 
in the amount or quality of an input.  
21California, and later all American auto emission r egulations imposed on 
manufacturers are an example of forcing a producer to adopt equipment regulations by setting 
aggregate emission regulations. For the earlier years of California’s regulations of auto  
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economists have contributed theory and empirical research on the results of 
equipment standards, which are similar to aspects of earlier public-utility and 
building standard regulations. These are valuable for themselves and for the 
light they throw on theories such as Stigler’s that controlled agencies are 
vulnerable to being “captured” by the very industry they are set to control.  
  Taxes and compensation. Some economists who write about taxes are 
dealing with compensation: the lump-sum bribes, and settlements and charges 
that are paid when a person is deprived of a use of land or when a polluter is 
deprived of the use of a process. Others are dealing with fines. In theory, this 
subject applies to most branches of environmental economics, but in practice 
it applies mostly to land-use economics. It arises when a wildlife or 
endangered-species agency (or a voluntary “heritage” group) sets out to 
control, or acquire, land, marine reserve, seacoast or wetland for habitat 
conservation. This is an old subject for land economics and for law and 
economics.
22  
Charges and incentives. In microeconomics, economists are trained to 
look for pricing, rather than rationing, to control the flow of anything and so 
minimize the costs associated with the flow. This point of view, extending 
Pigou’s thoughts on using taxes to remove extra social costs, has led to 
economists’ widespread enthusiasm for emission charges, or any kind of 
quantitative permit fee.
23 Like regulations, fees may vary with the location of 
the emission.
24 Most economists and their textbooks favour these, but there 
are few actual examples.
25  
                                                                                                                                        
emissions, see Dewey (2000, pp. 57-83). 
22See Schwindt (1992, especially Appendix A-1) for a survey of compensation 
policies. 
23Ideally, both pollution charges and quotas vary among seasons and locations; and 
are flexible as information accrues and circumstances change. For air-pollution charges in 
Canada, see Baar (1995, pp. 102-103); see also sewage charges and graduated automotive 
clean-air charges. There is a serious theoretical literature on “prices versus quantities” under 
uncertainty.  
24For pioneering work by economists on water releases, see chapter by Dorfman in 
Maass et al. (1966, pp. 88-158 and 494- 539); for least-cost removing of organic pollutants 
from river basins, see various writings by O. Herfindahl and Allen Kneese. 
25There do exist charges on emissions of industrial pollutants into rivers and 
estuaries in France, Germany, Holland, Italy and Australia, that vary according to the 
pollution load. Critics say these are set so as to capture the rent of the right to emit pollutants  
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Tradable pollution permits. Under the common law applying to water 
and to land, an owner may have established a reasonable freedom to use his 
own land, or the right to use the land of another, in a manner that pollutes the 
environment. Where this was so, the freedom could be bought and sold with 
the property right. This idea leads on to government-created pollution or 
emission rights, an influential and practical idea invented by John Dales in 
1967, perhaps inspired by western appropriative water rights. The idea has 
been applied to some air emissions in the United States. In the United States, 
and even in Canada, there is also a voluntary trade in certificates of reduced 
pollution.
26 (The similar tradable-quota idea is old stuff in fishery regulation; 
introduced in New Zealand and Iceland in the 1970s it is today found in 40 
Canadian fisheries.) Soon after Dales wrote, the idea of transferable 
international water-pollution permits was recommended in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) advisory deliberations 
(see Scott and Bramsen, 1972, pp. 403-404; and Scott, 1976a, pp. 177-218). 
The OECD did not make much of that idea and proceeded with an agenda of 
distributional debates about whether polluter or victim country should pay. As 
a result, although domestic and international tradable air-pollution permit 
systems were subsequently introduced, tradable  water-pollution permit 
systems are still rarely mentioned, even in jurisdictions that have tradable 
water-diversion permits.  
 
Counting Canadian Environmental Economists  
 
Environmental economists in Canada can hardly be said to form a group. 
Those who work with zoologists on fish habitat, those who work on smoky 
production processes and those who develop statistical indicators of 
sustainability rarely speak. This is partly because they are divided as between 
government service, consulting and academia.  
We can start with those in provincial government service. They are 
relatively few in number, perhaps less than 35, coast to coast. Most of their 
jobs are in evaluation. Although most provincial laws do not explicitly call for 
economists’ studies, they help decision-making about utilization and prices of 
Crown and private lands for endangered species, wilderness, parks, logging, 
                                                                                                                                        
rather than to discourage pollution.  
26Tietenberg (1985) is rightly given credit for widespread understanding and 
acceptance of the mechanics of the idea among U.S. economists.  
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mining, roads and towns. Not only do they make estimates of likely 
utilization, impact and cost but also of mitigation and compensation payable.  
Turn next to the federal government. I have made no real count, but 
would guess there are in Ottawa as many economists working on 
environmental economic questions as in the provinces. They are in five or six 
departments, notably Environment Canada and Industry Canada. As might be 
supposed, they are more concerned with the planning of policy or legislation 
than with application and enforcement, especially when the problems involve 
international cooperation, trade and productivity. More of their work is 
published or publishable than I was aware. Anyone would be impressed by 
Statcan’s regular environmental and resource accounts and indicators, and by 
recent joint reports for the National Climate Change Process on costs and on 
emissions-permit strategies.  
At both levels of government, senior economists from finance depart-
ments and treasury boards occasionally lend assistance on complex inter-
governmental liaison and legislation issues.  
A third category includes the private economic consultants. They are 
perhaps more relied on by environmental bureaux than by any other branch 
of government, involved in hearings, assessments and, perhaps especially, 
lawsuits. Some of them have outstanding capabilities for making survey-based 
estimates and predictions of willingness to pay, traffic, and so on.  
 
A fourth category includes academics in Canadian economics, agri-
cultural economics, business and public administration faculties.
27 They 
number about 90, perhaps 5 per cent of the total academic economics 
establishment.
28 Some belong to the Canadian Economics Association, some 
to the Canadian Association for Ecological Economics (a political-economy 
group) and some to the Committee for Resource and Environmental 
Economics (CREE), more for research-oriented economists. I reckon that of 
the 90, about 30 do environmental-economics research that shows up in 
specialized economic journals. 
29 
                                                             
27There are also energy, fishery, recreational, urban and forestry economists in 
various faculties, some of whom sometimes work/teach in environmental studies.  
28About 150 names are on the CREE mailing lists; it includes unknown numbers of 
non-Canadians, government officials and graduate students. About 65 people come to a 
CREE meeting. The 5 per cent number comes from comparing 90 with the up-to-2,000 
members of Canadian academic departments, estimated by John Helliwell in Howitt (1993). 
29Browsing through the bibliographies of environmental monographs and textbooks, 
I found about a dozen Canadian names. The huge bibliography of one European book listed  
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What the Academics Work on 
 
What do Canadian economists write papers about?  
One way to find out is by consulting the programs of CREE for the 
period 1992–2000. I have scored the various subjects by assigning points to 
each paper according to the number of authors, co-authors and discussants 
who dealt with it. In the years from 1992 to 2000 the point total for all such 
papers was 475.
30 I have sorted them into four groupings.  
                                                                                                                                        
three hundred environmental-economic papers and studies, about 15 of them by Canadians.  
30At a typical CREE meeting, of those speaking and/or commenting, about 75 per 
cent were connected with Canadian universities or consultancies, about 20 per cent with U.S. 
(and overseas) universities and research institutes, less than 5 per cent with Canadian 
governments, a few with international organiza-tions and none with any environmental 
organization, Canadian or otherwise. 
First, by far the most popular grouping was of papers on more or less 
traditional land-management topics: fisheries, forests, water resources, mining 
and energy. Many, but a minority, of these were concerned with modern 
aspects of resource management, such as sustainable development and 
ecosystem integrity. (This whole grouping included 30 per cent of all CREE 
points.) 
Second, following land management, came air and water quality and 
pollution abatement. Most of these papers treated their subjects theoretically 
(11 per cent of total). This grouping was hard to distinguish from others 
containing discussions of regulation, law, property rights and enforcement (6 
per cent) and another set on tradable permits (5 per cent), (22 per cent 
altogether).  
Third, following pollution, came a group of papers on valuation, specialist 
and expert reports on existence, option and recreational valuations. Many 
were by-products of user surveys, often processed by contingent-valuation 
and travel-cost methods; to these were related a group discussing 
experimental methods, (20 per cent altogether).  
Fourth, well below the valuation grouping, was a set of papers on 
endangered species and wildlife diversity, along with wilderness and habitat (5 
per cent). Related groupings contained papers on sustainable development 
and growth along with environmental indicators and green accounting (6 per 
cent), trade, mobility and location, primarily trade theory (5 per cent); and 
recycling (1 per cent), (adding up to 18 per cent for this group).  
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These four research groupings account for more than 90 per cent of the 
activity at CREE meetings. In addition, there were several sessions describing 
current policies and problems by government economists, and others on 
federal and international institutions (8 per cent together).
31  
A tentative conclusion is that the single category that engages the largest 
number of Canadian academic economists is the analysis of the emission of 
air pollutants. They are, however, perhaps concerned more with contributing 
to the American and international literature on this global problem than with 
understanding or improving Canada’s problems or policies. (In comparison, 
members of a group of Canadian “environmental” academics in political 
science and public administration know more and write much more about 
Canadian pollution policies.)
32  
At the present time, there seems to be not much contact between 
Canadian academic economists and their opposite numbers in government. 
This is illustrated by the literature of the last five years on distributing and 
trading emissions permits. Some writers have Kyoto greenhouse gas (GHG) 
quotas in mind, but others are writing quite generally about trading any kind 
of emission permit. The academics build models and seek a high degree of 
generality. Looking for various kinds of efficiency under various assumed 
conditions, they are led to ask about the polluters’ permit market when 
polluters know that there will be a future “adjustment” of the number of 
permits outstanding (and their price) when further knowledge becomes 
available. The authors make no attempt to identify their various sets of 
alternative conditions with any set of conditions actually existing among, say, 
pulp producers, oil refineries or car owners in Canada, or anywhere else. (At 
                                                             
31The total is 98 per cent, reflecting rounding. Papers were fitted into categories 
according to their titles, a rough-and-ready procedure. Category percentages may overweigh 
discussants relative to speakers. 
Another, laborious, way to find out what Canadian environmental economists wrote 
papers about would be to consult their Web sites. Doing this for a few names told me, not 
surprisingly, that an able economist has the capacity to do many things: teach, supervise, write 
papers for CREE and for international conferences and journals, act as consultants, run 
institutes, and so on. To obtain a balanced picture of the professional lives of the whole 
community of academic environmental economists, however, was beyond my resources. 
32Consider a very recent political science book on Canadian pollution. In its 
substantial index of names, it cited only six economists, four of them Canadians. All are 
referred to as experts on the economy, none as sources or experts on any environmental 
question.  
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least, they do not do so in their published work.
33) The team of economists 
writing Using Tradeable Emissions Permits 2000 do investigate and explain 
their ideas about how a stated number of polluters will bid for permits given 
their uncertainty about how others will respond to the new system. But these 
economists too do not seem to have come to grips with the uncertainty 
literature.
34  
                                                             
33For a contribution, with a short bibliography, see Kennedy (1999). A similar kind 
of uncertainty lies behind the “price versus quantity” debate about fishery catch quotas versus 
taxes on the catch.  
34In this particular example, the economists in the working group are drawn from a 
variety of sources, but are mostly from provincial and federal departments. Their work is 
tributary to the agenda of the confusing, multi-disciplinary, “national climate change process”, 
working on the “national implementation strategy on climate change” and related “business 
plans”. This “process” draws on 450 experts from industry, academia, NGOs and 
government, formed into 16 working groups, of which the group producing the emissions 
permits report is one. The report-producing work of the groups has been co-ordinated by a 
“national air issues coordinating committee (NAICC)”. One can sympathize with the 
economists trying to design, and explain, and publish a tradable emissions system report, 
written for individuals drawn from many disciplines. Sympathy aside, their hard work does 
help to illustrate that there is a gulf between academics and public servants.  
 
 
The Differences and their Explanations 
 
 
In this section I examine, and offer some explanations for, the difference 
between the activities and contributions of economists in the United States 
and abroad and those of Canadian economists.  
 
 
What are the Differences? 
 
Specialization on theory. Relatively more Canadian academic specialists 
work on theory than in the United States. Much of this theory tends to be 
normative — some of it is about minimizing the cost of reaching selected 
environmental targets; and some of it tracing the effects of selected 
instruments.  
 
Little Canadian Content. As already mentioned, my impression is that the 
topics most Canadian economists work on show little knowledge of actual or  
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proposed Canadian policy or issues. They are in tune with the literature, 
which more than anything reflects the interests of American environmental 
economists.  
American academics are interested in United States’ policy issues, partly 
because they get a good exposure to them: indirectly in their graduate schools 




Minor Explanations: Theories about why our  
Economists Write Theory 
  
Publication in international journals. One line of explanation has to do with 
the influence on young economists’ careers of different kinds of research and 
publication.
35 Their professional success depends in part on the acceptance 
and publication of their research in journals recognized by their colleagues. 
This means, primarily, American journals. One correspondent put it to me 
that young Canadian academics find that American journals simply will not 
accept a paper about Canadian institutions or environmental problems. So the 
young economists write “theory” papers, which are more acceptable and 
interesting to any journal, especially those outside Canada.
36  
 
Staying mobile. Supplementary to that line of explanation is a view that 
applies to all in the humanities and social sciences, not just economists of the 
environment. This is that academics in their first appointments prefer to 
follow research leads that will keep them mobile, and avoid research topics 
that will be deemed by prospective employers as being too specific.
37 One 
way to do this is to work on abstract subjects and methods that are welcomed 
                                                             
35See Scott (1967, 1993), in connection with the international migration of social 
scientists (brain drain) and with the 1990s composition of the membership of the Canadian 
Economics Association. 
36“To get an article published in most of today’s top rank economic journals, you 
must provide a mathematical model, even if it adds nothing to your verbal analysis” (Lipsey, 
2001, p. 17). The author adds that “ several economists” have expressed agreement to this 
complaint. 
37See Scott (1993). Other contributors to the symposium tended not to disagree 
with the explanation.   
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in all departments in all countries. Those who work on international trade 
theory are said to be especially welcome in U.S. departments. For some this 
means simply continuing to work a vein already opened in a Ph.D. thesis in a 
U.S. graduate school; for others it means a more explicit selection of a 
portable field. 
 
Impatience with Canadian data and institutions. A third minor line of 
explanation is that some Canadian environmental economists are impatient 
with what they know of Canadian environmental problems, policies and 
institutions. This is partly because data and description of Canadian 
phenomena have not been refined into terms that invite economic analysis. It 
is easier to join the profession in working over American endangered species 
and related legislation than it is to bone up on the problems and regimes 
governing polar bears or migratory birds.  
 
Why are these “minor” explanations? To the extent that the explanations 
above are correct, they tell us something serious about environmental 
economics in Canada. These academic economists may be encouraged by 
their departments to tell their students about resources, the environment and 
related policy in Canada, but the incentives facing them are mainly for them 
not to do homework or real research on these matters.  
Nevertheless, I call these “minor” explanations because they are actually 
encountered in most branches of economics in Canada. Getting data and 
doing research on Canadian topics is difficult, yet it is not as well rewarded as 
doing theory or research on topics that are welcomed in non-Canadian 
journals. In all economic fields new theory tends to be developed in 
unconstrained ways that may be tractable, but are empirically relevant only 
by accident (Lipsey, 2001, pp. 11 and 19). The question then arises, are there 
additional forces driving some environmental economists into “internally 




Major Explanation: Canadian vs. United States Federalism  
 
As promised, my major theme is that the nature of Canadian federalism puts 
an imprint on the nature of our environmental policy problems. In almost any 
branch of environmental economics, as the subject is conceived today, the 
research and theorizing of economists deal with American policy questions. 
They are questions that at one time were issues for an American government 
making choices among methods, procedures or policies (e.g., Methods: how  
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to value recreation in public land-use decisions. Procedures: how to get 
economic project decisions from the Corps of Engineers. Policies: how to 
deal with endangered species on public lands). Similarly, today’s new policy 
questions for Americans are providing the agenda for the next generation of 
researchers and theorists. 
In Canada, the physical environmental problems may be similar to those 
arising in the United States, but the range of policy choices is different. They 
seem to be aspects of the same old Canadian confederation trappings: dividing 
the roles with the provinces, the special position of Quebec, the balance of 
relations with the United States  — all questions that stimulate political 
scientists but disconcert economists.  
 
United States: federal jurisdiction over environment. As a long-run matter 
the federal government has picked up, and held on to, responsibilities for 
expanding the set of environmental functions, imposing participation on the 
states.
38 True Congress, more than once balking at assuming the regulatory 
functions of environmental policies, as in the Reagan era of the 1980s and 
1990s, has allowed some impatient states to take their own paths. But these 
have been pauses, not reversals. When Congress musters all its powers, or 
when the administration addresses itself to all the tasks with which it has been 
charged, the states must fall in with federal policies and standards, especially 
if they are to be “funded” for doing so.  
The general result is that Washington is the headquarters of 
environmental policy research. There large statutory agencies undertake the 
active supervision of air and water quality policy, management of public lands 
and parks, development of endangered-species policies, and, of course, the 
conduct of international environmental diplomacy. For economists interested 
in these matters — as for economists interested in, say, public finance — the 
federal government is the government.
39 They see only one. It enables them 
                                                             
38These three observed characteristics of U.S. intergovernmental relations in the 
field of environmental policy, that distinguish it from Canadian inter-governmental relations, 
are identified by Kathryn Harrison (Fafard and Harrison, 2000, especially pp. 67-76). 
39For illustration that this has been the case for decades, see Russell (1979). In this 
conference volume, 31 social scientists, mostly economists, discussed the “new” public-
choice theorizing and its applications to energy, environment, education and health problems. 
Some papers dealt with actual decision-making. In the latter, it is clear that all authors and 
their discussants thought of social choice research as being relevant for the central 
government. The word “state” hardly appeared. For example, references to the automobile 
industry/ environmentalist debate over emissions’ regulation never mention California, which 
originated the regulations. References to international fisheries scarcely mentioned the states,  
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to treat government as unitary, its policies unique, emanating as it were from 
a black box. Pondering and proposing environmental policies, they have no 
more reason to consider the plurality of government than have colleagues 
specializing in policies for hospitals, museums, highways or naval bases.  
Consequently, when economists apply welfare theory, they tend to 
translate the jargon words social and society as “national”, referring to the 
nation as a whole. When other social scientists analyze the social effects of an 
environmental policy, they write about the impacts on tribes, states or 
communities, whereas economists estimate the expected changes diffused 
throughout the nation and indicated by changes in the national product and its 
composition. They picture the Washington lawmaker as something like the 
“planner”
40 at the centre of some expositions of welfare economics, having all 
necessary reallocating and distributing powers to make progress towards the 
general (=national) efficiency optimum.  
 
Canada: Shared jurisdiction. In Canada, things are different. Nearly all 
actual pollution management is carried out at the provincial level. When 
federal politicians take a deep breath and decide they must act in the matter 
of, say, pesticides, endangered species, or acid rain, they are usually bracing 
themselves to induce the provinces to act.  
It is true that they can assemble an armoury of powers: spending, POGG, 
criminal law, commercial shipping fisheries and international-relations. But 
they have not felt that the mere existence of these powers provides them with 
a positive justification for taking over all waste emissions or disposal.  
Their most widely-accepted function is to negotiate treaties and to see 
they are carried out.
41 But the latter responsibility is not usually matched by 
requisite law-making powers. Ottawa is obliged to enter into bargaining and 
coordinating, just as if it were one of the provinces itself.
42 Otherwise, the 
                                                                                                                                        
which then exercised regulatory jurisdiction.  
40See Economic Report of the President for various years, especially 1994, by 
President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, chaired by Joseph Stiglitz.  
41However, the treaty agreements may merely formalize, or may extend, an 
agreement already made by a province with a neighbouring U.S. state. These are not unusual. 
See Alley (1998) and Hodge and West (1998). 
42For an informed discussion and description of the workings of federal and 
provincial governments in a situation — Hamilton Harbour — where Ottawa has many direct 
responsibilities, see Sproule-Jones (1993, pp. 125-249).  
Economists, Environmental Policies and Federalism                  429 
provinces perceive that the federal politicians could, by choice of standards, 
implicitly dictate how the burden of complying with international standards 
was to be distributed.  
Some would say Ottawa’s strength lies in its coast-to-coast jurisdiction, 
which enables it to make policies and set standards that apply everywhere, 
which are then uniform. This is not a unique power, for the provinces can by 
agreement also achieve uniform laws among themselves. The transactions-
cost school would say that the assignment of the function is a matter of 
whether the political difficulty of federally enacting and enforcing uniform 
standards is greater than the provinces’ bargaining difficulty of agreeing on 
them and enforcing them (Breton and Scott, 1978, chs. 7 and 8). But as 
against this approach, the Canadian practical-politics school would say it 
seems mostly to be a matter of whether federal politicians want to occupy the 
assignment of powers that already exists, or to escape from it.  
Currently, federal politicians are not seeking to exercise wider powers. 
Instead, “harmonization”, “consultation”, “all-Canada accord”, and so on all 
indicate their unwillingness to try to supplant the provinces.
43  
Canadian provinces have l ong exercised powers not only to inspect 
plants; set safety, sanitary, and construction standards; and make property 
laws; but also to run the Crown’s own lands, minerals, water resources, 
forests, parks, hunting and wildlife. More so than American states, they have 
experienced regionwide bureaucracies to do these things. Changes in environ-
mental policy are, to the resource user and polluter, changes in continuing 
arrangements. The permits, certificates, leases and licences that symbolize 
provincial powers and ownership are the instruments in which ongoing, 
routine environmental policy will be embodied.
44  
Consequently, although there are centres of advocacy and of research, 
there is no national centre having economies of scale in environmental law-
making and enlightenment.
45 The economist who would understand and 
                                                             
43See Harrison (1996), and the essays in Fafard and Harrison (2000), for these 
regimes.  
44See chapter by Cohen, Scott and Robinson in Scott, Robinson and Cohen 
(1995, p. 183), on the jobs of officers requiring them to reconcile, in the field, their 
departmental, financial and environmental responsibilities.  
45Many universities have interdisciplinary environmental or sustainable-development 
research institutes, recently working on a chosen ecosystem. Canada also has the IISD, the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. It is indeed an international centre, giving 
much attention to environmental problems of the Third World. Canada also has its National 
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, which concentrates on making Canadian  
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improve the country’s environmental policies will not go to Ottawa to find a 
community of conceptualizers or researchers. The federal government’s 
changing policies are unpredictably responsive to the buck-passing by 
provinces,
46 to pressures from other nations, and to industrial and 
environmental lobbyists.
47 Neither is policy-making in the provinces more 
stimulating. True, there is a long history of introducing and enforcing 
environmental policies. But if the introduction of any of these was much 
supported by economic analysis of the alternatives, it was done quietly.
48 
There are good provincial environmental economists, of course, some 
working on pollution and some on related energy policies, recreation, logging 
and so on. Probably they work mostly with engineers, biologists, foresters, 
consultants, and financial colleagues in the provincial treasury, and rarely with 
each other or federal and international economists.  
 
Is Canada’s federal distribution of powers likely to follow that in the United 
States? Apart from negotiating treaties concerning g lobal pollution, there 
seems nothing special about the environment that would lead one to predict 
an early transfer of powers from the provinces to Ottawa. I discussed aspects 
of this question in Scott (2000).  
Here I briefly remind the reader of some frequently made political 
arguments regarding centralization of powers over the environment. In 
                                                                                                                                        
growth more sustainable. The first of these does some in-house research and publication, but 
the second relies on consultants to help it explore chosen problems. Two environ-mental 
NGOs, Pollution Probe and the Suzuki Institution consistently do some research and writing 
in-house, often economic in approach. Beyond these, we should notice less-specialized 
groups like the C.D. Howe Institute, the Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce, the Business Council on National Issues, the Fraser Institute and the 
Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, and energy, petroleum, wood-product associations, 
unions, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Canadian Wildlife Foundation. All 
occasionally commission studies with economic content to focus attention on some 
environmental problem. However, they rarely commission or undertake original research.  
46The title of Kathryn Harrison’s 1996 study.  
47See Harrison (1996) and the authors in Fafard and Harrison (2000) for Ottawa’s 
repeated cycle of engagement and disengagement, beginning in the 1970s.  
48Anita Kranjc (2000, pp. 122) and elsewhere says that the details of 
environmental policies of Ontario (and by implication of Alberta) are driven by emulating U.S. 
neo-conservatism. See her citations of other studies of provincial policies.  
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general, environmentalists favour centralization — to Ottawa — of powers 
over the environment. Industry is not united on the question, but firms do 
have several reasons for believing that they can escape from the burden if the 
provinces have the unnecessary powers. Governments do not necessarily 
seek powers to impose burdens on polluting industries, preferring to “pass the 
buck” to the other level of government. However, Ottawa may lose its 
attempt to not pass the buck, as its international relations’ responsibilities will 
keep it in the centre of the Canadian campaign to live up to the nation’s GHG 
responsibilities. If so, as this assignment of powers accumulates, we may be 
in for a centralized regime more like that in the United States. If so, Canadian 
economists may be able to assume that American generalizations about the 
role of “government” also apply here.  
 
·   Environmental NGOs and Green politicians favour centralization of 
powers. This seems sometimes to be a thoughtless desire to achieve the 
powerful position of their associated NGOs in Washington, who deal 
frequently with Congress and with a host of government officials and 
think-tanks. Such organizations, in Canada, complain that they have 
grave difficulties selling their arguments (e.g., about endangered species) 
in ten provinces instead of simply in Ottawa. While it is logically true that 
if the necessary power were centralized the pro-endangered-species-
NGOs could attain their goal by winning only one battle, it is also true 
that with centralized powers the NGOs could lose the endangered species 
war by losing only one battle.  
 
·   Environmentalists and biologists are said to favour centralized policy-
making because it results in uniform environmental conditions. This 
proposition needs much more analysis than space permits. Legislative 
centralization does not necessarily lead to uniform policies; uniform 
policies do not necessarily lead to u niform conditions; and uniform 
conditions are not environmentally healthy. Also, note the choice of 
administrative alternatives: politicians with centralized powers over the 
environment can choose within a wide range of achieving a given 
environmental condition: at one extreme they can themselves legislate 
environmental rules, laws and enforcement methods to be applied to each 
place within their jurisdiction; at the other extreme they can appoint and 
instruct expert officials to use their discretion in managing these places. 
All the combinations of these alternatives, and their outcomes and costs, 
can be achieved by a “centralized” assignment of environmental powers. 
Note, however, that many of them can also be achieved by a decentral-
ized assignment, by agreements, among smaller jurisdictions.  
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·   Industry is said to favour centralization and uniform regulation if they 
maintain fair competition among businesses in different provinces, if, that 
is, they prevent certain provinces from assisting local industries by 
removing high-cost environmental or pollution rules. Generalization is 
difficult, however: an industry that believes it can rely on relatively low-
cost pollution rules from a certain government will be in favour of giving 
the necessary powers to a government at that level.  
 
·   Industry is said to favour a continued decentralization of environmental 
powers. It is said that this is because existing provincial enforcement of 
tenure regulations on Crown lands keeps industry officers in friendly 
daily contact with provincial administrators, and provincial politicians. For 
example, compare control over fisheries and over logging. Fishery 
businesses regulated by mobile federal government officials are visibly 
less comfortable than their logging colleagues who deal with resident 
provincial forestry officers. It is also said that local businesses can get 
more comfortably involved in long-term political alliances with provincial 
than with national politicians. (However, recent international negotiations 
show that i t is possible for local business persons to work on friendly 
terms with federal trade, immigration and environmental officials.) 
 
·   Provincial and local governments (or some of them) are said to agree 
with industry in disliking a competitive “race to the bottom” of environ-
mental standards. There is little Canadian research to indicate whether or 
not there is competition in easing environmental standards, or whether 
such competition would lead to the relocation of polluting industries. 
When one reflects that the large-scale polluting industries are oil and gas, 
pulp and paper, electric power generation and metal smelters, one does 
not expect much relocation among Canadian provinces.  
 
However, Ottawa m ay lose its attempt to not pass the buck, as its 
international relations’ responsibilities will keep it in the centre of the 
Canadian campaign to live up to countrywide GHG responsibilities. 
 
Examples. No wonder that in Canada environmental economists find 
themselves faced with a jumble of provincial environmental regulations, with 
no big economic controversy common to them all. Of course, in a federation 
like Canada, all provincial and local functions, not just the environment, are 
characterized by a diffuseness of policies. But it does help to explain why  
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Canadian economists, when they study the environment and its challenges, 
are lured into considering well-defined American policy frameworks.  
Hazardous waste sites. It is easy for a Canadian economist to follow his 
or her U.S. opposite number in assuming that “government” has the choices 
that now face the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and its Superfund. 
But to make this assumption is to duck responsibility for analyzing how 
Canada’s provincial and municipal institutions already deal with abandoned 
garbage dumps, industrial waste sites, radioactive sites, and seepage from 
mine tailings-pond seepage.  
Taxing emissions.
49 Canadian economists sometimes follow European 
and American opposite numbers in promoting the efficiency of emissions 
taxes as against the present rough-and-ready regulations, even though, in 
Canada, the up-front costs of introducing several taxes in ten provinces would 
be costly. The responsibility would be that of the provincial finance ministers. 
They would find themselves collecting different taxes from apparently similar 
polluters, according to plant location, season, time, weather and so on. Each 
polluter’s assessment would change as these factors change. In my opinion, 
the provinces’ present political and fiscal arrange-ments could not handle the 
political pressure engendered by using this kind of tax as a corrective.
50 
Almost certainly, it would fall back to being regarded as another revenue 
source, like the tax on alcohol.
51 It is time that some Canadian economist, 
                                                             
49This paragraph is about a textbook-type charge per unit of pollutant emitted. 
There are other “pollution taxes”, such as the proposed carbon tax (see Olewiler, 1990).  
50Parliamentary governments, especially provincial ones, are unlikely to take the 
path-breaking step of delegating tax-setting to administrators, for the change in the amounts 
to be paid by some polluters could be a politically-sensitive matter. As well, administrators 
will be unwilling to take responsibility for setting effective deterrent taxes. Of course, any 
parliament is supreme, and, subject to the written constitution, can legally delegate what it 
chooses. But it has never chosen to delegate the setting of the rates of other deterrents, such 
as excises on tobacco and alcohol, or duties on agricultural imports. So it would probably not 
choose to delegate the setting of an unpopular emissions tax on municipalities, factories or 
farms. This may also explain why the provinces collect percentage stumpages and similar 
resource incomes instead of flat-rate royalties. 
51Provinces, however, do have peak-load prices and tolls on their utilities and 
highways, and these are analogous to deterrent pollution taxes. Indeed, there are surprisingly 
few purely regulatory or deterrent taxes at any government level, apart from those on certain 
imports and on alcohol and tobacco; and these are often regarded simply as revenue sources, 
with inelastic demands. Public-finance textbook authors, looking for illustrative examples of 
such taxes, often choose the non-existent pollution tax.   
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possibly one learned in the study of taxation, looked into how provincial 
budgetary procedures might handle charges designed not to raise revenue but 
to obtain information and to correct waste dumping.  
A “national” point of view. Canadian economists thinking in turns of 
benefit-cost analysis for project selection are likely to follow the American 
practice of defining benefits and costs as measurable changes in the national 
income (or product): “all final benefits and costs to whomsoever they 
occur...” as long as they are within the United States. The United States 
Supreme Court also accepts this principle when, in adjudicating the sharing of 
a stream between two states, it may award water to the state where it will be 
used to produce the greater net benefit (from a national point of view).  
If this doctrine were widely applied in Canada, it would produce very 
unfamiliar results. It would mean, when a province is selecting a project, that 
it ought to choose the one offering greatest national net benefit over one that 
provides more local income and employment. It would mean, as between 
upstream and downstream provinces, that they ought to allocate flows to 
whatever region promises to produce the greater net final benefit.
52 I do not 
believe a national-income maximization principle of choice has ever been 
accepted in Canada. Where local or national governments call for a benefit-
cost analysis they want a “multiple account” report revealing perhaps how the 
alternative versions of a project would affect the national income, but mostly 
how it would provide local jobs and how it would affect various financial 
funds and accounts.
53 As for interprovincial projects, Canadian selections 
usually emerge from intergovernmental bargaining, not from principles of 
national income maximization.
54 It is time for economists to think hard about 
what general rules ought to be recommended for project selection in Canada 
by provinces that want to do more than, say, mere local job creation.  
                                                             
52Compare parallel accounts of river apportionment in chapters by Barry Barton 
and Ralph M. Johnson in Saunders (1986, pp. 238 and 253).  
53I suspect that this is also a reason why, although the making of EIAs  is 
mandatory for nearly all federal undertakings, the making of a benefit-cost assessment is not. 
54An outstanding example is Krutilla (1967). The World Bank and other agencies 
has applied cross-border project selection in developing countries. For some theory, see 
Jones, Pearse and Scott (1980).  
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Right-sizing versus fragmenting powers over the environment. Canadian 
economists, thinking about externalities, seem to accept the simplistic idea 
that control over an ecosystem should not be “fragmented” among small 
political jurisdictions. In this they echo an older American opinion that, 
because the typical state
55 had too small an area to make laws and rules for all 
of a river-basin’s interconnected levels and flows, the basin’s hydrology and a 
region’s ecology ought both to be internalized within a senior government’s 
borders. Recently a similar view, that at least the source and the victims of 
pollution ought to be within the same jurisdiction, has been stressed (see 
Paehkle, 2001; and van Kooten and Scott, 1995). Taking these ideals at face 
value, they hardly apply to many Canadian problem ranges or ecosystems, 
which typically already are contained within one large province (at least, as 
the word ecosystem is bandied about in these discussions). For example, the 
Great Bear forest ecosystem(s) is/are entirely within British Columbia, the 
Canadian portion of the Great Lakes within Ontario, and even the vast 
Saskatchewan and Peace River basins each within three.  
In any case the economics of the fragmentation complaint is a muddle. 
Coase’s theory of the firm reminds us that just as producers have a choice 
between integrating and contracting, so the system of government has a 
choice between handling spillovers within a jurisdiction created among several 
units at one level of government and handling it by assigning it to a single unit 
of government at a higher or lower level. We have decades of theorizing 
about whether to reassign functions to a supranational body, to the nation, to 
provinces, or to municipalities. All this theorizing tells us to compare the 
relative difficulty or transactions costs, at each level.
56 For example, to right-
                                                             
55This view seems to have been accepted by most water-resource economists. In 
his 1955 thesis, Otto Eckstein mentions dozens of U.S. federal agencies; scores of river-
basin projects; four project purposes; and even one Canadian province. But he rarely 
mentions states, never as decisionmakers. The same is true of the highly influential Harvard 
water program of 1955–65, culminating in Maass et al. (1966). For contemporary papers 
that emphasize state water-resource powers and responsibilities see those collected in Smith 
and Castle (1964, pp. 341-445). 
56This is the theme of Breton and Scott (1978, chs. 6 and 7). For each province, 
costs of internalized administration can be balanced against costs of coordination. In general, 
there will always be problems about the sizes of jurisdictions. Assume that a jurisdiction is 
persuaded that a river basin or ecosystem should be under an integrated set of land-use 
controls. If its area is too “small” it will be forced into coordination with its neighbour. If it is 
too “large” it will be forced into fragmenting its own administration. Both responses have 
costs.  
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size an environmental policy, it can be ceded from provinces with small spans 
to their larger neighbours, to a joint multi-province body or to the central 
government or they can re-shape their policies so that citizens may disregard 
borders and litigate against pollution sources in other provinces.
57 One can 
invent still other devices for preventing jurisdictional borders from applying 
suitable policy to a problem.  
Note, however, that getting the right area to be governed would not 
guarantee that a government would exploit this advantage; nor, if it did, that it 
would make appropriate environmental decisions.
58  
Conclusion on federalism. The purpose of these examples has been to 
suggest how the differing federal structures of the two countries may explain 
why economics in Canada has not yet come to grips with the country’s 
environmental policy problems. First, the absence of a central policy-making 
and policy-analyzing establishment has meant that many Canadian economists 
are in closer touch with United States and European environ-mental leaders 
than with each other. Second, those who do grapple with analyzing questions 
                                                             
57Water pollution: in the 1960s, the Nordic countries began to give victims of 
pollution the right to ignore the border and to sue in the source country (see Scott, 1976b). 
Air pollution: recent informal trading in pollution permits in GHGs allows the benefit of an 
abatement in one province to be sold to a polluter in another. Doing this may involve class 
actions. Water jurisdictions: in both Canada and the United States constitutional, treaty or 
local legislation usually prevents citizens of one jurisdiction from acquiring and importing water 
from another jurisdiction. In the United States, interstate water compacts may govern the 
extent of private interstate transactions (“commerce”) in water. See Huffaker et al. (2001)  
and related papers in bibliography and Web site. 
58See Breton and Scott (1978, p. 11); see also van Kooten and Scott (1995). 
Some aspects of the “fragmentation” of the Saskatchewan River ecosystem among the three 
prairie provinces was long ago taken care of by agreement among the provinces, with Ottawa 
as a minor partner. One of the first explicit official recognitions of an ecosystem-wide 
approach to resource management was that by the International Joint Commission, reporting 
on the pollution of the Great Lakes. The idea was accepted by the United States and after a 
few years embodied in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978. In my opinion, 
the ecosystem approach was needed because there were so many U.S. states with 
jurisdictions over activities affecting the lakes. In Canada, only the province of Ontario was of 
importance. If, say, only New York State had been involved in the United States, an 
ecosystem approach would have required only a state-to-province contract or agreement, 
with only nominal roles for the national governments. Indeed the fragmentation argument 
might well have been turned on its head, now asserting that Ontario and New York should 
each “fragment” their areas to produce smaller matching lakeside regional management units.   
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about the Canadian environment and its protection have to free themselves 
from many of the assumptions about policy-making now automatically 
adopted by United States analysts. There, most environmental issues have 
drifted into federal-government jurisdiction, and can be safely analyzed as if 
there were one all-powerful government. Here, the extent to which provincial 
environmental policies need to be made uniform or just coordinated, and by 





Governmental Questions for Economists and  
Economics Tasks for Governments  
 
 
What Needs Work? 
 
Canada’s future environmental policy-making will be dominated by decisions 
about reducing the GHGs. Whereas in the past its environmental policies have 
been fragmented, in the future they will be interdependent. This is because 
the aim this time is not to get the right balance for each region between 
change in environmental quality and the cost of doing so, but to find the 
optimal way of making Canada’s contribution to global GHG concentration.  
I use the word “optimal” because, as has been seen above, Canadian 
governments are not agreed on any more specified criterion for project 
selection or environmental improvement. In particular, neither the provinces 
nor the federal government have adopted cost-minimization, national-income 
maximization nor employment maximization.  
                                                             
59Thanks to Professor Fred Riggs, University of Hawaii, for suggesting to me the 
importance of the American division of powers (as opposed to the parliamentary system) at 
the federal level as an explanation of different kinds of policy. Under the heading of openness, 
this suggestion is also to be found in various political science studies, such as Paehkle (1989); 
and Fafard and Harrison (2000).  
The study teams in the National Climate Change Process (NCCP) have 
merely sketched their alternative working suggestions about which industries 
will be called on to abate their GHG emissions, and, in particular, about how 
emission permits will be distributed initially. The implied invitation to analysts 
outside the public service to discover the advantages and disadvantages of the 
alternatives, and make recommendations, has not been followed up. The 
NCCP has made their data available, and no doubt there is plenty more in the 
files. Economists can now investigate more fully the regional and inter-
industrial implications, and compare their results with published studies of  
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distributing fishery quotas, grazing permits, and U.S. acid-rain permit 
allocations.  
The NCCP suggests that transferable permits be “grandfathered”, as is 
done with fisheries quotas, or auctioned. Should auctioning of permits be 
considered, there is time to compare the economics of emission-permit 
auctions with other government tendering and auctioning institutions. How 
much would it matter that in some regions, or for some pollutants, the 
number of bidders would be very small? Canadian economists have played a 
major role in studying the working of existing systems of auctioning natural-
resource rights. Other economists have given some attention to the not-very-
competitive “sales” by which oil permits, forest-cutting licences and other 
federal and provincial rights have been allotted. What is needed now is their 
expert prediction of the results of auctioning individual emission permits in 
Canada, both regionally and nationally.  
Introducing provincial emission permits would involve a double change: 
not only from command-and-control to a market-like instrument but also 
from regulating production methods and equipment to regulating the allowable 
quantity of emission. Getting the required quantitative data and setting targets 
might actually be more difficult and costly than creating a system to allot 
percentages of these targets to private firms. This is only one of the questions 
about permits at the provincial level that need economists’ examination.  
What are the consequences of the non-uniformity of provincial pollution 
regulations? Is there a role for Ottawa to make sure that policies (not just 
environmental assessments) are harmonized? Political scientists say the role 
might be justified by economic considerations, but economists have not said 
this. Scores of papers, like this one, have mentioned an intergovernmental 
downward race to the bottom, as governments ease environmental require-
ments to attract or hold industries. In such a race, the provinces might be 
urged on by industry, apprehensive of any threat of their competitive position, 
within Canada, if their rivals in other provinces secure a pollution-regulation 
advantage. These questions cry for actual case studies and fact-based 
generalizations.  
The economics of interjurisdictional strategy and bargaining is studied by 
economists as between countries, but hardly between provinces. Yet 
provincial-level data are available for cross-boundary trade, cross-boundary 
pollution, and cross-boundary migration, in the presence of differences in 
pollution regulation. Research using these d ata would help with certain 
international-pollution studies, and also have relevance to provincial boundary 
issues. What would be the result if whole regions (or provinces) were allowed 
to bid for permits against other regions? What would be the costs if provinces  
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made interprovincial agreements to prevent such bidding, or in other ways 
prevent a permit drain from their industries to richer ones outside?  
Can transaction and administrative costs of alternative regimes be 
measured? In most discussions of federal versus provincial jurisdiction, and 
of private litigation versus public regulation versus market-type permits, 
authors remark that much depends on the associated levels of transactions 
and administration costs (including those of information and enforcement). 
Economists give the impression that they know one control instrument is 
more “efficient” than others in the absence of transactions costs, but they 
obviously know very little about this when control instruments work 
imperfectly and also have unknown administration costs. Dewees and a few 
others have given us a sense of these costs — but more estimates are needed 
— of instruments used by governments at all levels.  
More profoundly, those economists who are interested in public finance 
and the economics of federalism can use this kind of research to enter the 
constitutional debate. To what extent could the various powers over the 
environment be shifted to other levels of government, taking into account the 
resulting changes in performance, and also the usually theoretical changes in 
coordination, signalling, administration and mobility costs?  
Economists can also contribute to choices about public choice by 
recognizing that the distribution of GHG permits among people, industries, 
regions, provinces, and so on, is akin to the distribution of wealth. To a 
certain extent, tradable permits for GHG emissions can make them the same 
distribution. For example, regions with wealth can buy GHG permits and so 
enjoy industrial growth. As well, they can buy up and retire permits to emit 
noxious fumes and local pollutants and so enjoy pollution-free air and water. 
Low-wealth regions may be in for stagnation. But permits may not be 
tradable. If so, the initial permit allocation is like an endowment of another 
kind of wealth, distinct from money. Recognizing this opens the possibility for 
a “constitutional choice” question of the kind discussed by William Baumol 
and by James Buchanan.
60 Under the rules of tradable emissions, the holder 
of a right in Area A will be predictably unwilling to donate it to an emitter in 
area B. But if the rules are not yet made, a person might support such a 
transfer if he knows that all similarly-situated persons will participate in it. 
The Canadian revenue-equalization system emerged from such a 
“constitutional” decision. Many economists have helpfully analyzed, criticized 
and defended this system. They should do the same for the various systems 
                                                             
60See Baumol, 1969; Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, pp. 134-149. Amartya Sen 
similarly referred to an “assurance” principle of joint action.   
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by which GHG and other pollutant emission rights are to be initially 
distributed.  
   In this connection, some Canadian economists in the law-and-economics 
area have considered our expropriation laws and whether to entrench 
constitutionally the sanctity of property. Yet they have been slow to discuss 
governmental repossession or narrowing of private leases, etc. on Crown 
lands. Compensation is asked for, but the question is still open. Analysis is 
needed of this, and of the sequestering of strictly private lands inhabited by 
endangered species. This is a modern version of the older “betterment and 
compensation” land-use question: should private users pay, and should they 
be paid. In general, government can take either of two routes to improve 
private care of the Crown lands. It can fortify today’s property rights, giving 
them more exclusivity, transferability and security. Then it can use market 
instruments. Alternatively, it can continue with rights that have little of these 
characteristics, attaching to them stipulations and conditions about pollution 
and land use. Then it must inspect and enforce the conditions. Which is the 
least costly route? As each kind of land tenure has its own amount of 




What Governments Can Do to Encourage Research on 
Canadian Environmental Questions  
 
Most people would agree that Canadian environmental policy as a whole is 
both unpredictable and unstable. The rules are not as bad as those that 
macro-analysts once called “stop-go” but they have some of the same 
hesitancy about them.  
Part of the reason is economists’ own public appearances. Policymakers 
and the public see that new proposals receive backing from environmentalists 
and opposition from hired economists. While they may know that from Adam 
Smith’s time economics has been friendly to the idea of public education and 
other social enterprises, they do not know that it is just as friendly to the idea 
of public investment in clean water, clean air and biosystem integrity. But 
economists do not bother to shout all that from the rooftops. They are on the 
whole allowing much of the field to be occupied by spokesmen who mostly 
cheer on environmentalists by finding bad guys for them to blame.  
Unlike their experience with economists who specialize in health 
economics or in education and labour-force studies, reporters from the media 
are unlikely to find many economists they can telephone who will say, “yes I 
know about that policy proposal”. This ignorance is something that govern- 
Economists, Environmental Policies and Federalism                  441 
ment departments and administrators can do something about. They can hold 
seminars. Of course, there are committees on special questions that do bring 
economists together, including some outsiders and some from the other level 
of government. But these are more like business inter-departmental 
coordinating bodies than seminars or joint working parties. They can circulate 
their internal studies to a meaningful list of outside economists. They can 
support untied economic research grants (not the same as offering consulting 
or modelling jobs). They can offer temporary visitorships to academics and 
students. They can take a leaf from the book of the Fisheries Research Board 
of Canada, which long published an interdisciplinary journal that was 
respected among academics here and abroad. Both levels of government do 
some of these things for other sciences, but it is rare to find an economist 
who has seen the inside of an environment or industry department, except as 
a paid advisor or consultant. 
Governments should realize that it is because of their policies that most 
academic teachers of environmental economics are little more aware of the 
grand sweep of environmental choices than is any reader of the daily 
newspaper. It is not enough that they have put some agreements, final 
decisions and working papers on the Internet. By their policies, they have 
failed to draw young economists into current concerns, much less encouraged 
or inspired them to look for research topics. Not surprisingly, many of these 
economists fall back on their textbooks and their graduate-school course notes 
for their teaching , and on papers in academic journals to get started on their 
research, with the results that I have suggested in the sections above.  
Both levels of government can make these improvements. The federal 
government, already having a larger establishment of economists, can move 
faster and further. The provincial governments have most to gain from even 
modest steps towards making nearby economists familiar with their environ-
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